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Secrets backend

The platform keeps its own sensitive material — provider API keys, database credentials, TLS material — in a self-hosted secrets manager rather than in plain Kubernetes manifests. Those secrets are stored encrypted and synced to the workloads that need them automatically, so a key lives in exactly one place and is never committed to git.

The secrets manager is OpenBao — the open-source (MPL-2.0) successor to Vault — with a web UI at https://vault.<your-domain> and native single sign-on.

Who can see this

Sign-in is by Keycloak SSO (OIDC), restricted to members of the vault-admins group — the same identity you use for the console. A local break-glass admin is retained for recovery if identity is unavailable.

Sign in

Open https://vault.<your-domain> and choose the OIDC method — "Sign in with OIDC Provider" hands you to Keycloak and back. An HTTP request redirects to HTTPS automatically. Only vault-admins members are granted the admin policy; everyone else is denied.

The OpenBao sign-in screen with the OIDC method selected — single sign-on through Keycloak

What you can do

  • Inspect secrets. Browse the secret engines and paths the platform uses (provider keys, datastore credentials, service tokens) and their policies.
  • Understand the flow. OpenBao is the source of truth; External Secrets reads from it and projects Kubernetes Secrets into each workload's namespace. You manage the secret once, here, and the platform reconciles the rest — you rarely edit workloads directly.

Open-source and redistributable

OpenBao is MPL-2.0 licensed — permissively open source, so it ships with the product and installs air-gapped with no proprietary-license constraint. It is a drop-in replacement for the (now source-available) Vault it succeeds.

Next steps

Enterprise AI governance, on infrastructure you own.